A year after UN sanctions on Iran were reimposed through the snapback mechanism on 27 September 2025, Tehran continued exporting oil through intermediaries, tankers and companies registered outside the country. But widening discounts and higher shipping, insurance and financial-settlement costs reduced the returns generated by its trade.
The return of sanctions lifted under the nuclear agreement followed the Security Council’s failure to extend their suspension. They joined broader US sanctions targeting the oil, financial, shipping and technology sectors, as well as foreign entities helping Iran circumvent the restrictions.
Exports remain steady as revenues come under pressure
International economics expert Omar Khalif Gharaibeh said Iran had developed tools over years of sanctions to deal with the restrictions, including barter, gold, non-dollar currencies, digital currencies and intermediary networks. He added that these tools were not a cost-free substitute for conventional trade and banking channels: gold requires storage and liquidation, while the yuan and rouble lack the dollar’s liquidity and broad usage. Barter and commissions, meanwhile, increase transaction costs and lengthen the process.
A study published by the Dutch Clingendael Institute in January 2026 concluded that the return of sanctions through the snapback mechanism had not caused an immediate collapse in Iranian oil export volumes, after trade had shifted in previous years to less visible shipping and financing networks.
Researcher Nikolay Kozhanov said Iranian oil exports averaged about 1.5 million barrels per day in 2024 and about 1.6 million barrels per day in 2025, suggesting that the impact of the new pressure would be felt more in revenues than in volumes. The study showed that discounts on Iranian crude relative to Brent widened from between $3 and $6 a barrel to between $8 and $10 a barrel in late 2025, alongside increased shipping, insurance and financial-settlement risks.
China absorbs nearly 90% of Iranian crude, mostly through independent refineries, providing Tehran with an outlet to continue exporting while giving buyers greater leverage to impose their pricing terms. Iran is therefore trading stable export volumes for lower returns on each barrel.
Gharaibeh summed up the equation by saying that “every intermediary takes a cut,” explaining that the fees imposed by each network and link in the trade chain increase the cost of circumventing sanctions and, in his words, lead to the financial “strangulation” of Iran.
Discounts, tankers and front companies
The US Treasury Department said in a statement on a network linked to the sale of Iranian oil that an oil-sales arm affiliated with Iran’s armed forces had been prepared to offer a discount of $17 a barrel in a specific deal with a potential buyer.
The network included front companies that chartered vessels, shipping brokers, commissions linked to cargoes, ship-to-ship transfers to conceal the cargo’s origin, misleading shipping documents and alternative financial channels. These tools accumulate additional costs across the chain of services, intermediaries and risks required to complete transactions.
The US Treasury said sanctions on more than 180 vessels linked to the transport of Iranian oil and petroleum products had increased costs for Iranian exporters and reduced the revenue generated from each barrel sold. The assessment is consistent with the findings of the Clingendael study and Gharaibeh’s view that continued exports do not restore trade to normal conditions, but instead shift it into a higher-risk, less efficient market.
Sanctions extend to alternative trade channels
On 24 August 2026, the US Treasury Department launched a campaign it called “Economic Outcast,” saying it targeted revenue lifelines and sanctions-evasion networks. The campaign expanded secondary-sanctions risks in sectors that Iran uses to support its economy, it said, including digital assets, technology, gold, aviation and shipping.
The expanded scope of the targeting means that gold, digital currencies and transport companies in third countries are no longer merely alternative means of completing trade; they are also exposed to US sanctions. This increases the number of intermediaries, raises transaction costs and lengthens payment and supply routes.
Additional costs for aviation and the economy
The US Treasury announced sanctions on 36 targets for supporting Iran’s aviation sector, including 27 Iranian airlines, as well as front companies, intermediaries and transport routes through third countries to obtain aircraft, spare parts and technology.
The restrictions turn the acquisition of aircraft, spare parts and technical services into a longer process involving more companies and countries, while suppliers, carriers and financiers may pull back for fear of exposure to sanctions. Every delay in supply and every contract requiring new commercial cover adds burdens to an economy facing pressure on its currency and prices, as well as domestic imbalances.
Gharaibeh said sanctions erode the state’s capacity over the long term but do not guarantee rapid political change, as the government can reprioritize and direct available foreign currency toward food, medicine and raw materials while accepting less efficient trade routes to ease the shock.
A year after the snapback mechanism returned, the impact of sanctions is now visible in the cost of keeping trade going as much as in its volume—from price discounts and intermediary commissions to alternative tankers and delays in receiving funds—making Iranian commercial activity more complex and less efficient.
