Iran conveys terms for ending war to Washington through Qatari mediation

On Wednesday 23 September, Iran delivered its terms for ending the war and lifting the US blockade to the United States through Qatari mediation managing communication channels in New York, as diplomatic efforts sought to contain the military escalation in the Gulf and reopen international shipping routes through the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian demands and the course of Qatari mediation

The Iranian demands were delivered after talks on Tuesday between Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and US envoy Steve Witkoff, on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly and under Qatari sponsorship. The session sought to assess prospects for reviving the diplomatic track and overcoming the deadlock that followed understandings reached in last June’s memorandum.

Readings by international relations professors and regional affairs experts indicate that Tehran is pursuing a phased approach separating urgent issues—foremost an end to military strikes, the lifting of the maritime blockade and the recovery of frozen funds—from more complex regional and nuclear issues, whose discussion it seeks to postpone to a later stage.

Tehran’s conditions for ending the war and lifting restrictions

The demands are based on conditions announced by Major General Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. They include the immediate release of detained assets, an end to the war on fronts stretching from Lebanon to Gaza and Yemen, a halt to attacks on Iranian territory and non-interference in Iran’s internal affairs.

Iran’s stated positions show its insistence on the full and immediate lifting of restrictions, while analysts say Tehran is showing procedural flexibility behind closed doors over timetables for implementing reciprocal steps. One proposal under discussion is the experimental opening of the Strait of Hormuz for 7 days to test Washington’s readiness to reduce military pressure and end economic restrictions imposed on Iranian ports.

The Strait of Hormuz as an Iranian bargaining tool

The Strait of Hormuz occupies a central place in Iran’s strategic calculations. Tehran views it as a key bargaining tool in the deterrence balance, rather than merely a route for international trade. Accordingly, Iran links any retreat on the shipping issue to security and economic guarantees concerning an end to military operations and the lifting of restrictions on its ports.

Major General Mohammed Abdel Wahed, an expert on strategic affairs and maritime security, says the Iranian demands are divided across several levels, including conditions needed to resume negotiations and procedural demands linked to the Strait of Hormuz. Tehran links opening the maritime route to the immediate lifting of restrictions on its ports and an end to satellite and drone surveillance operations.

The maritime demands also include opening discussions on US military bases in the Gulf, which Iran considers a constant source of threat. According to Abdel Wahed’s assessment, Tehran views the temporary opening of the strait as a test of intentions, as it believes opening it fully and unconditionally would cost it one of its most important bargaining tools.

The economic and security factors shaping Iran’s position

Mahjoub al-Zuwairi, an academic and expert on Iranian affairs, identifies three factors governing the position of decision-makers in Tehran. The first concerns the economy, including lifting sanctions, recovering funds and breaking the maritime blockade. The second involves ending what he described as the notion of a permanent threat, embodied in the ability of the United States and Israel to launch surprise strikes against Iran and its network of influence.

The third factor, according to al-Zuwairi, is postponing the nuclear issue until security and economic gains have been consolidated. He also places the proposal to open the Strait of Hormuz for 7 days in the context of Iran’s desire to respond to pressure from China and preserve its relationship with Beijing, which is interested in the continued flow of energy through the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb.

Nafja Sabah al-Bouafra al-Kuwari, a political science professor at Qatar University, says economic, military and security issues have become part of an interconnected negotiating package. In her assessment, Tehran is making any retreat in Gulf waters conditional on tangible US steps ending the military threat and restrictions on the movement of its ports and shipping.

Writer and political analyst Reza Ghibeshawi links Iran’s current conditions to an attempt to return to the substance of the “Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding”. He referred to conditions previously put forward by the spokesman for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including a complete halt to the war and threats, the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, an end to restrictions on Yemen and the release of around 24 billion US dollars in Iranian assets.

According to Ghibeshawi, the same conditions include preventing US interference in Iran’s missile and nuclear programmes. They reflect Tehran’s desire to return to previous understandings rather than open additional files that could impose new obligations before direct military and economic issues are addressed.

Hamid Azizi, the International Crisis Group’s Iran project director, summarises the demands as an immediate end to the war on all fronts, the release of frozen assets, recognition of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, a reduction in the US military presence in the region and rejection of including the nuclear issue in this phase of the talks.

Azizi says these conditions are generally consistent with the memorandum of understanding signed last June and express an Iranian effort to return to its original provisions without assuming burdens or offering new concessions. The US administration, by contrast, is seeking an understanding broader than the previous agreement, explaining the continuing dispute over the scope of any potential deal.

Washington is dealing with the crisis from a position of strength and does not want to grant Tehran gains for free or appear to be backing down before allies and US public opinion. This creates an impasse between the administration’s desire to halt the escalation and its refusal to pay financial or military costs in advance of an understanding.

Scott Lucas, a professor of political science and international relations at the University of Birmingham, sees two possible paths for the US position. The first is a comprehensive approach that Washington rejects because it is unwilling to commit to prior financial and military concessions. The second is based on gradual steps, which Lucas describes as the only realistic formula remaining.

Lucas says moving the New York sessions from “exploratory talks about talks” to full negotiations requires a genuine US willingness to offer financial and military concessions, along with a departure from the logic of unilateral dictates. He also notes that Iran’s more hardline public rhetoric does not rule out pragmatic flexibility in undisclosed negotiating channels.

Khalid al-Jaber, executive director of the Middle East Council on Global Affairs in Doha, describes the US approach as a dual track combining dialogue with continued military and economic pressure.

He says Washington recognises the high economic cost of continued conflict and disrupted shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, but refuses to appear forced into negotiations or responsive to Iranian pressure. According to al-Jaber, the US administration wants any agreement to be presented as the result of American power, rather than a response to Tehran’s conditions.

This coincides with what al-Zuwairi described as a policy of concessions “by the drop”, noting that offers to release funds gradually fell from 24 billion US dollars to 12 billion, then to 6 billion, before settling at 3 billion without any actual release being carried out.

Hamid Azizi says President Donald Trump’s administration does not want merely to revive the previous agreement, but is seeking a broader formula it has called a “memorandum of understanding plus”. This formula would place the nuclear issue at the core of the understanding and address it in advance, allowing Trump to present the outcome to US public opinion and political circles as a major achievement and strategic victory for his administration.

Major General Mohammed Abdel Wahed points to a contradiction in US presidential rhetoric, with positions alternating between praise for the negotiating process at one point and renewed threats of destruction at another. This discrepancy makes it more difficult to build the trust needed to move from exchanging conditions to implementing simultaneous measures.

The shift in communications to the halls of the United Nations General Assembly and the meeting between the Iranian and US delegations represents a procedural change in managing the crisis, from relying solely on military targeting to attempting to establish political channels. However, experts say the resumption of diplomatic contact does not mean that genuine political rapprochement has been achieved. Nafja al-Kuwari distinguishes between reopening diplomatic channels and reaching political rapprochement.

She says the New York meetings enabled both sides to test the limits of their demands, but fundamental differences over the blockade, shipping and sanctions remain. The real test, she believes, will be their ability to move from preconditions to gradual and simultaneous implementation steps.

Al-Zuwairi says the meeting between Araghchi and Witkoff was not an accidental event, but followed prior Qatari coordination. In his assessment, this coordination resulted in US flexibility in granting expanded entry visas to the Iranian delegation, including the president, the foreign minister and a team of technicians and negotiators familiar with the details, unlike the restrictions faced by Iranian delegations in previous years.

Ghibeshawi cites the halt in US strikes on Iranian territory for several weeks as an indication of progress, saying it strengthens the possibility of continued quiet negotiations and a revival of the Islamabad agreement track. Al-Jaber does not raise expectations to the level of reaching a “grand deal” or settling all the causes of disagreement.

He says the most realistic path focuses on a “small agreement” that freezes the escalation, restores shipping and establishes temporary rules of engagement, while deferring the more complex structural issues to later stages. Qatar’s role in these contacts goes beyond carrying messages between the two sides, drawing on its relations with Washington and Tehran and the Gulf region’s direct exposure to the consequences of the conflict and disrupted shipping.

Al-Jaber says Qatari mediation is linked to managing a risk affecting regional stability and Gulf energy exports, rather than being merely a conventional political initiative. According to him, Doha relies on its ability to keep communication lines open with both capitals and work towards compromises that allow each side to step back from escalation without announcing a retreat or acknowledging defeat.

Al-Kuwari places Qatar’s move in New York within a broader vision of collective regional security put forward by Qatar’s Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, in his address to the United Nations General Assembly. She says the success of the mediation depends on breaking down maximalist demands and turning them into implementable stages, beginning with a maritime de-escalation that could serve as an entry point to a broader settlement.

Azizi stresses the importance of Qatari mediation in bridging gaps and devising compromises on disputed points, in pursuit of a temporary, phased understanding that halts hostilities and expands the space for diplomacy. However, Azizi urges cautious and realistic optimism because of the complexity and interconnectedness of the regional situation.

Ghibeshawi says Qatar’s efforts, which included channels and visits to Tehran and Beijing, reflect Doha’s use of soft power in conflict resolution. At its current stage, the effort focuses on containing the escalation, securing energy flows and restoring stability to the waters of the Arabian Gulf.