The arrival of Israel’s new Ahi Dragon submarine from Germany to Haifa was delayed for months because of shortages of spare parts and components and the refusal of European countries to allow it to dock, according to military reports published on 23 September 2026. The delay is putting pressure on the schedules of Israeli naval projects and increasing the risk of disruption to supply chains linked to German shipyards.
Military correspondent Yaniv Kubovich said the Israeli military acknowledges that European boycotts, both "covert and overt," are having a direct and immediate impact on its development and equipment programs, particularly in the navy. The restrictions involve defense components made by companies in Norway, Denmark and France and used by German shipyards to build submarines and Sa'ar vessels for Israel.
Restrictions on components and ports
Norway and Denmark refused to allow the submarine to dock for maneuvering and testing, even though it was flying the German flag and was owned by the shipyard at that stage, forcing the crew to take a longer route. The military says other European countries have also begun restricting Israeli military and civilian vessels from entering their ports to obtain supplies and fuel.
Military correspondent Or Heller said in a report published on 23 September that the delay was caused not only by a change in the maritime route but also by a "shortage of spare parts and components" resulting from Europe’s refusal to provide assistance. Correspondent Elisha Ben Kimon added that France had joined Norway and Denmark in refusing to supply some of the components needed by German Thyssenkrupp shipyards.
Risks extend to the Dakar program
Military correspondent Lilach Shoval reported on 23 September that the navy fears restrictions imposed by France, Denmark, Norway and other countries could extend to the 3 submarines in the Dakar program currently being built in Germany. They are expected to be delivered in 2033, prompting Israel to keep its older Dolphin submarines in service to maintain the size of its force until the new submarines enter service.
The problems that emerged in the Dragon project have prompted the Defense Ministry and the navy to increase the share of components targeted for domestic development under the Dakar project. However, this approach does not eliminate dependence on German shipyards and the European supplier network, nor does it offer an immediate solution to supply disruptions.
Correspondent Nitzan Shapira reported on 23 September that Dragon had arrived after a voyage of about 25 days, equipped with an air-independent propulsion system, or AIP, allowing it to remain underwater for longer periods. The submarine will not become operational immediately upon arrival, as it needs about two months for Israeli systems to be installed and for the process of bringing it into service to be completed.
Trade and maritime infrastructure
Supply and port restrictions have taken on an economic dimension because the overwhelming majority of Israel’s trade moves by sea. The military views the disruption of commercial shipping, higher insurance costs or denial of port access as threats to the economy and military continuity, citing the experience of the port of Eilat following Houthi threats in the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
The navy is seeking an increase in its budget and size as the Turkish fleet expands, the Red Sea grows in importance, and the need to protect gas platforms, ports and undersea communications cables increases. Its plans include bringing 5 new Reshef vessels into service, developing autonomous maritime systems and building partnerships with Greece and Cyprus.
Long-term industrial dependence
There is no quick alternative to Thyssenkrupp shipyards under the current programs, as submarines require years of design, construction and testing, followed by a phase for installing Israeli systems. This makes the disruption of a single component, test or port call a factor that can affect the project’s schedule, cost and readiness.
A study by Brig. Gen. (res.) Dr. Sasson Hadad, a researcher in national security economics and a former financial adviser to the chief of staff, published on 12 February 2026, concluded that the war had exposed shortcomings in the defense industry’s ability to support a prolonged war and ensure "logistical resilience." The study called for an industrial policy providing production capacity, stockpiles and basic materials to reduce dependence on external supply chains.
