Allegations by Yemen’s government forces that Ansar Allah (the Houthis) are using modified Iranian air-defence systems capable of flying in search of heat-emitting targets have raised concerns about an expanding aerial threat in the southern Red Sea.
The government account says the weapons are launched from Hudaydah governorate towards flight paths, potentially endangering civilian and military aircraft as well as those operated by humanitarian organisations. According to a statement by the government forces, the systems differ from conventional air-defence equipment because they rely on cruise or loitering missiles that can remain airborne for up to 25 minutes while searching for a possible target.
The statement added that the missile is fitted with a thermal seeker that tracks heat sources, rather than being limited to direct engagement with a preselected target. If these characteristics are technically confirmed, the pattern of risk could differ from that associated with a conventional air-defence system operating on the basis of precise information and clear rules of engagement.
Civilian and military aircraft share physical characteristics and thermal emissions that sensors can detect, raising concerns that they may be difficult to distinguish when the missile is flying in a congested area. The Houthi group has not commented on the government statement.
The spokesman for Yemen’s government forces linked the reported development to statements by Iranian officials, saying in his statement: “This dangerous escalation coincides with threats issued by Iranian Supreme Leader adviser Mohammad Mokhber and Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Mohsen Rezaee to target and disrupt aviation services in the region, following sanctions imposed on Iranian airline aircraft.”
Experts explain the systems and their potential capabilities
Yemeni military and strategic expert Ali al-Dhahab said the weapons described in the government announcement could be “hybrid” missiles or projectiles combining the characteristics of a missile and an unmanned aircraft.
He described its battlefield effect as creating a “constant threat” to any moving heat-emitting object in the air, whether an aircraft, missile or heat-seeking projectile, rather than limiting the risk to a brief launch towards a known target. He added that these capabilities could restrict military air activity in the area, but would not stop it completely.
He attributed this to the possibility of dealing with the projectiles using various means of interception, either from the ground or by warplanes, meaning that their impact would also depend on their level of deployment, the effectiveness of their guidance, and the ability to detect and intercept them.
Yemeni military and strategic analyst Brigadier General Mohammed al-Kumaim said the Houthis, in his assessment, were no longer relying solely on Iranian ballistic missiles and drones, but had begun employing advanced air-defence technologies based on “loitering” cruise missiles. He said these missiles can roam the skies for around 25 minutes, searching for targets by tracking electrothermal emissions along their flight path.
Potential uses of the projectiles in the region
Al-Dhahab suggested that the use of these projectiles, in cooperation with Iran, was linked to two main objectives. The first, according to his analysis, was an attempt by the Houthis to counter what is known as the “kill box” designated by the Yemeni government on 10 September, within a quadrilateral area extending between Mokha, Taiz and the Mokha coast.
He explained that this area represents a potential zone for Houthi movements and the flow of their weapons and fighters from Taiz towards Mokha. According to his account, government or coalition forces use artillery, missiles and aircraft to track movements and activities within the zone. Cruise missiles or hybrid projectiles could play a role in countering the weapons and firing platforms used to monitor the area and target movements within it.
The second objective, according to al-Dhahab, relates to Iran’s effort to respond to sanctions imposed on its civil aviation sector by threatening the movement of aircraft operated by regional countries that may comply with US sanctions, as well as UN aircraft. He said this type of weapon could serve as a counter-pressure tool in an area highly sensitive to civil air transport.
He noted that air routes linking Asia and Africa cross the Red Sea, while aircraft from the southern Red Sea and the Horn of Africa travel through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea towards countries on both shores. This extensive air activity means that any potential threat near international corridors extends beyond the scope of Yemen’s internal military confrontations.
The spokesman for the government forces had said that the Houthis were using Iranian weapons converted into “cruise” missiles, launched from Hudaydah governorate towards flight paths in the southern Red Sea. He said they threatened the safety of civilian aircraft and humanitarian organisation aircraft, given the weapon’s reported ability to search for heat-emitting targets while remaining airborne.
Hudaydah’s location expands the potential threat
Hudaydah is of military and geographical importance because of its location on Yemen’s western coast and its proximity to sensitive maritime and air corridors. If these systems are confirmed to be operated from coastal areas of the governorate and to reach areas near international air routes, the potential threat would no longer be confined to military operations underway inside Yemen.
However, verifying this assessment requires field and technical information on launch sites, missile trajectories, the targets they engaged, recorded incidents, and the weapon’s actual capabilities.
The reported characteristics therefore remain based at this stage on statements by the government forces and expert analyses, and are not by themselves sufficient to establish the systems’ operational coverage or patterns of use. Al-Kumaim said the introduction of these new and unconventional weapons added another factor to the military theatre in the southern Red Sea.
He considered them a direct and immediate threat to civil aviation safety in an area used by the world’s major airlines, because the missiles described do not, in his assessment, possess sufficient technology to distinguish between military and civilian targets.
He explained that any aircraft crossing the target area could be placed at risk if the missile relied solely on thermal emissions to detect and pursue its target. Al-Kumaim linked these movements to a broader Iranian strategy that, he said, aims to exert regional and international pressure by attempting to impose “aerial strangulation” in the region, alongside economic pressure targeting energy supply chains and oil transport operations.
Tactics to compensate for the absence of ground-based radar
Experts believe the Houthis’ reliance on cruise missiles may be a tactical attempt to compensate for the absence of ground-based radar networks or their vulnerability to attack. In theory, a loitering projectile can search for a target while airborne instead of relying entirely on a fixed ground-based surveillance system that can be detected and attacked.
The tactic could also serve to disrupt adversaries’ aircraft or drones monitoring the group’s supply lines, while expanding the threat to UN and humanitarian aviation and using the surrounding risks as a tool of political and negotiating pressure. Strategically, analysts link this to an attempt to expand aerial pressure in an area where military operations are connected to shipping, energy and international transport.
Taken together, the government statements point to a potential development in the Houthis’ air-defence capabilities through systems reportedly modified to remain airborne for longer and search for targets using thermal tracking. These capabilities could be significant within Yemen in confronting drones and aerial reconnaissance operations, but would become more sensitive if their operation near international air routes in the southern Red Sea were confirmed.
The reported characteristics alone are not sufficient to establish a deliberate strategy to target international civil aviation, particularly as the group has previously said it would not target shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait except for what it described as “Saudi ships”.
Assessing the level of risk remains dependent on the relevant international and regional authorities obtaining accurate information, identifying potential operating areas, and exchanging navigation warnings to reduce the likelihood of an aviation incident in the region.
